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1 Introduction
In response to the great recession of 2007-2008, governments and central banks across the
industrialized world have resorted to a wide set of short-run stabilization policies, rang-
ing from boosts in public spending, labour tax refunds, consumption tax cuts, near zero
short-term interest rates and nontraditional balance-sheet monetary tools. The breadth
and depth of the economic conditions, however, have called into questions the e¤ec-
tiveness of conventional and unconventional short-run stabilization policies and, several
years since the outbreak of the nancial crisis, the uncertainty around the impact of ex-
isting scal and monetary interventions does not seem to have dissipated. Furthermore,
the surge of public debt associated with the recent short-run stabilization policies has
triggered a perhaps even more pervasive uncertainty about the long-run sustainability
of existing scal positions.
The signicance of long-run scal uncertainty is exemplied in Figure 1, which re-
ports the debt-to-gdp ratio projections prepared by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce
(CBO) back in 2009. The extended baseline scenario reects the assumption that cur-
rent laws generally remain unchanged, which is lawmakers will allow changes that are
scheduled under current law to occur, forgoing adjustments routinely made in the past
that have boosted decits. The extended alternative scal scenario is constructed under
the hypothesis that certain macroeconomic policies in place since a number of years will
be continued going forward and that some provisions of law which might be di¢ cult to
sustain for a long period will be modied, thus maintaining what some analysts might
consider current policies, as opposed to current laws.
Three points are worth emphasizing about the CBO projections. First, the two
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scenarios produce debt levels which are apart from one other by more than 150% of
GDP by 2037. Second, the discrepancy increases with the forecast horizon. Third, the
two scenarios are computed under maintained assumptions about the e¤ectiveness of
government and tax policies on real activity, and therefore they abstract implicitly from
uncertainty about the e¤ectiveness of short-run policies.
Despite the recognition in policy and academic circles that short-run uncertainty
(about the current stance of scal and monetary policy) and long-run uncertainty (about
the future stance of economic policies) may both have a highly detrimental impact on
the economic outlook, the empirical literature on policy uncertainty has, so far, mostly
focused on current government spending and tax policies.
In this paper, we complement existing contributions by estimating the impact on real
activity of four types of policy uncertainty associated with government spending, tax
changes, public debt and monetary policy. While the focus on short-run stabilization
policies is shared with earlier studies, the analysis of long-run scal uncertainty is to
the best of our knowledgenew.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, uncertainty about government
debt has a large and statistically important impact on real activity, with e¤ects of about
0:5%, 0:3% and 1% after two years on GDP, non-durable consumption and investment
respectively. These estimates are sizable: on the basis of our empirical model, we calcu-
late that to generate e¤ects of similar magnitude a monetary policy shock would need to
move the short-term nominal interest rate by about 60 basis points. Second, the impact
of net taxes volatility appears to be more important than uncertainty about government
spending and monetary policy, with the impact of the latter two shocks close to zero.
Third, debt and net tax shock uncertainty appears to have a more detrimental impact
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on consumer condence than on business condence. Fourth, the contribution of policy
uncertainty to variations in output, consumption and investment is around 20% to 30%.
Fifth, shocks to public debt volatility make the largest contributions to aggregate uctu-
ations in GDP, accounting for about one third of the total share explained by economic
policy uncertainty shocks at horizons beyond the rst year.
In our empirical model, the volatility of identied shocks is allowed to have a direct
impact on the variables of a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR).1 This is an
advancement relative to existing SVAR studies with stochastic volatility which do not
feature a direct link from second moments to rst moments (see for instance Primiceri,
2005, Canova and Gambetti, 2010, and Gambetti, 2011). Furthermore, by modelling
the dynamic relationship between the volatility of identied shocks and endogenous
variables, our framework can shed light on the causality behind the dynamic correlations
between the uncertainty measures and other macroeconomic variables reported by Baker,
Bloom and Davis (2016), Stock and Watson (2012) and Caggiano, Castelnuovo and
Groshenny (2013), among others.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on quantifying the e¤ects of eco-
nomic policy uncertainty on the real economy. On the macro side, Fernández-Villaverde,
Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) and Born and Pfeifer (2014) use
estimated volatility of government spending and tax policy shocks in calibrated general
equilibrium models of the U.S. economy to study the real e¤ects of short-run scal in-
terventions. Exploiting cross-country variation in natural disasters, terroristic attacks
and unexpected political events, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) nd that uncertainty
has detrimental e¤ects on both the level and volatility of GDP growth. Brogaard and
1Throughout the paper, we will refer to volatility of structurally identied shocksas uncertainty.
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Detzel (2012) quantify the impact of a search-based policy uncertainty measure on stock
market returns. Using rm-level data, Julio and Yook (2010) report that the timing of
national elections has a dampening e¤ect on corporate investment while Handley and
Limao (2012) assess the impact of uncertainty about trade policies on rmsinvestment
and entry decisions. It is worth emphasizing that, unlike most earlier contributions, our
main focus is on uncertainty about scal sustainability and as such it seems closer in
spirit to the quantitative models put forward by Bianchi and Melosi (2015a and 2015b)
on the extent to which uncertainty about how rising public debt will be stabilized can
account for the dynamics of U.S. ination during the Great recession.
The paper is organized in ve parts. In section 2, we lay out the empirical method.
In section 3, we present the estimation algorithm and the restrictions to isolate scal
and monetary policy innovations. The main results are reported in section 4. In the
last part, we assess the robustness of our ndings to alternative identication schemes
for the scal policy shocks as well as to including the average cost of public debt.
2 Empirical Model
In this section, we use a simple generalization of structural VARs with stochastic volatil-
ity, which makes it suited to study the impact of economic policy uncertainty on macro-
economic variables. In particular, we refer to the following empirical model:
Zt = c+
PX
j=1
jZt j +
JX
j=0
j~ht j + 

1=2
t et; et~N(0; IN) (1)
where

t = A
 1HtA 1
0
(2)
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In equation (1), the vector Zt denotes the i = 1; ::; N macroeconomic variables, IN is
a N  N identity matrix, while ~ht = [h1t; h2t:::hNt] refers to the log volatility of the
structural shocks in the VAR. The structure of the matrix Ht in equation (2) is given by
diag(exp(h1t); exp(h2t)::: exp(hNt)). TheAmatrix has ones on the main diagonal and the
structure of the matrix is chosen by the econometrician to model the contemporaneous
relationship amongst the reduced form shocks. We discuss our choice for the structure
of the A matrix in Section 3.
The transition equation for the stochastic volatility is given by:
~ht = ~ht 1 +Q1=2t ; t~N(0; IN); E
 
et; i;t

= 0; i = 1; 2::N (3)
with the covariance matrix Q being diagonal.2 There are two noteworthy features about
the complete system (1)-(3). First, equation (1) allows the volatility of the structural
shocks ~ht to have a direct impact on the endogenous variables Zt.3 Second, the structure
of the matrix A in equation (2) determines the interpretation of the structural shocks and
hence their volatility Ht: As discussed below, these two features imply that, by imposing
an appropriate set of restrictions on the A matrix, our framework is able not only to
identify monetary and scal shocks but also to investigate the impact of innovations to
the volatility of these structural shocks on the variables in Zt.
Note that equation (3) makes the assumption that the shocks t to the volatility
equation and the shocks et to the observation equation are uncorrelated. With this
2In the working paper version (Mumtaz and Surico, 2013), we show that the results below are
robust to allowing for possible co-movements among volatility shocks. Under this scenario, however,
the interpretation of the impulse response functions and variance decomposition becomes slightly more
convoluted (and possibly less intuititve) relative to the case of a diagonal Q presented here.
3In our specication it is the log volatility (rather than its level) to enter the VAR equations. This is
primarily because the level specication proved to be far more computationally unstable. In particular,
the level specication is sensitive to the scaling of the variables with the possibility of overow whenever
the scale of the variables is relatively large.
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assumption in place, given an estimate of Q1=2, one can interpret an innovation to the
ith element of t as a shock to the volatility of the i
th structural shock and then calculate
the response of the volatility ht and the endogenous variables Zt. Under the more
general scenario of a full covariance matrix among the volatility and the level innovations,
the identication of the volatility shocks is substantially more convoluted and further
identifying restrictions are required to separate the innovation to the volatility from the
innovation to the level. In particular, there seems to be no simple way to assign hi;t to
a particular structural shock. In contrast, the assumptions in equation (3) allows us to
use standard identication schemes.
This framework builds upon and extends the empirical models in Mumtaz and Zanetti
(2013) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015), with the main departures being the iden-
tication of the policy uncertainty shocks, especially those related to scal policy, as
well as the novel focus on government debt, which is discussed in the section on identi-
cation.4 Finally, the model presented above is related to a number of recent empirical
contributions. The structure of stochastic volatility, for instance, closely resembles the
formulations used in time-varying VAR models (see for instance Cogley and Sargent
(2005), Primiceri, 2005, Canova and Gambetti (2009 and 2010) and Canova, Gambetti
and Pappa (2009)). Our model di¤ers from these studies in that it allows a direct impact
of the volatilities on the level of the endogenous variables.
The framework proposed in this paper can be thought of as a multivariate extension
of the stochastic volatility in mean specication put forward by Koopman and Uspensky
(2002) and applied by Berument, Yalcin and Yildirim (2009) and Lemoine and Mou-
gin (2010). Furthermore, our model shares similarities with the stochastic volatility
4Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2014) and Alessandri and Mumtaz (2014) use VARs with common sto-
chastic volatility in mean as in Carriero et.al (2016) but do not identify any structural shocks.
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specications with leverage studied by Asai and McAleer (2009).
3 Estimation and identication
In this section, we present the Gibbs sampling algorithm to estimate the empirical model
presented in the previous section and the identication strategy to isolate the dynamic
e¤ects of the policy volatility shocks. The vector of endogenous variables, Zt, contains:
the log of real per-capita government spending, the log of real per-capita investment,
the log of real per-capita consumption, the log of real per-capita GDP, annual consumer
price ination, the log of per-capita net taxes, federal government debt held by the
public as a percentage of nominal GDP, a measure of the monetary policy instrument,
business condence and the University of Michigan consumer condence index.5
The sample runs from 1970 Q1 to 2015 Q4. In order to proxy the stance of monetary
policy we use the three-month Treasury Bill rate (3m TB rate) from 1970 Q1 to 2008
Q4. However over the 2009 Q1 to 2015 Q4 period we replace the 3m TB rate with the
shadow interest rate estimated by Wu and Xia (2015) using a non-linear term structure
model in order to proxy the monetary policy stance under the zero lower bound. The
appendix provides details on the sources of the data and their construction.
As the model contains a large number of endogenous variables, we keep the specica-
tion parsimonious and restrict the lag lengths P and J to 2 and 1 respectively.6 Finally,
we use linear de-trending to account for low-frequency movements in the macroeconomic
variables.
5Note that in our estimation we consider the face value of federal debt rather than the market value.
This is mainly because data on the market value of debt consistent with NIPA based measures of taxes
and spending include in our model are not readily available from o¢ cial sources.
6The results below are robust to setting either P or J to 4, though the estimates are less precise
because of the considerably larger number of parameters.
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3.1 The Gibbs sampling algorithm
The non-linear state space model (1)-(3) is estimated using a Gibbs sampling algorithm.
The appendix presents details of the priors and the conditional posterior distributions
while a summary of the algorithm is laid out below, proceeding in the following steps:
1. Conditional on a draw for the stochastic volatility ~ht, and the matrix A; equation
(1) represents a VAR model with heteroskedastic disturbances. We re-write the
VAR as a state space model and draw from the conditional distribution of   = [; ]
using the algorithm in Carter and Kohn (1994).
2. Conditional on a draw for ~ht and  , the elements of the matrix A can be drawn
using a series of linear regression models amongst the elements of the residual
matrix vit = 

1=2
t eit, as shown in Cogley and Sargent (2005). Conditional on ~ht,
the autoregressive parameters i and variances Qi can be drawn using standard
results for linear regressions.
3. Conditional on  ; A; i and Qi, the stochastic volatilities are simulated using a
date by date independence Metropolis step as described in Jacquier, Polson and
Rossi (1994) - see also Carlin, Polson and Sto¤er (1992).
We use 500,000 replications in total discarding the rst 50,000 as burn in. We
base our inference on every 45th draw of the remaining replications giving us a set
of 10,000 draws. The appendix presents the Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostic and
ine¢ ciency factors which suggest that the number of iterations used are su¢ cient to
achieve convergence.
9
3.2 Identication of the policy shocks
The statistical identication of the stochastic volatilities requires a normalization of
the innovation covariance matrix 
t. This can be conveniently obtained by a Cholesky
factorization of the covariance matrix 
t = A00;tA0;t. While such a normalization has
no specic economic content, an appropriate ordering of the endogenous variables in
the vector Zt can allow one to attach an economic interpretation to the orthogonalized
shocks (see Sims, 1980, Primiceri, 2005, and Canova and Gambetti, 2009). The variables
are ordered as follows: (1) government spending, (2) investment, (3) consumption, (4)
GDP, (5) ination, (6) net taxes, (7) government debt, (8) monetary policy instrument,
(9) business condence and (10) the University of Michigan consumer condence index.
The specic ordering proposed above assumes that government spending (consumer
condence) is the most (least) exogenous variable in the system. The rst assumption is
justied by the lags of scal policy and follows the identication strategy for spending
shocks in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2007, p. 192), who argues that "by
and large, [discretionary] government spending on goods and services does not respond
to macro economic news within a quarter." Ordering consumer condence last appeals
to the same rationale used in the identication strategy by Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz
(2005), who note that fast moving variables like nancial and condence variables
are the most likely to react within the quarter to macroeconomic news. The ordering
of the remaining variables implies that the short-term interest rate is allowed to react
contemporaneously to the slower-moving variables while the latter can respond only
with a quarter lag to unanticipated movements in the former. This is a rather standard
identication for monetary shocks in the VAR literature.
As for net taxes, we follow Caldara and Kamps (2008) in assuming that these are
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a¤ected contemporaneously by GDP and prices but react only with a lag to the short-
term rate and the consumer condence index. The rst assumption is based on the
idea that shocks to output and ination a¤ect the tax base within the quarter and this
leads to contemporaneous changes in tax revenues. However, as taxes are dened net
of interest payments, it is likely that they are not a¤ected immediately by changes in
interest rates and nancial variables. The main di¤erence relative to the identication
of net tax shocks in Perotti (2007) is that we estimate (rather than impose xed values
for) the contemporaneous elasticities of taxes to output and ination.7 Perotti (2007)
also sets to zero the contemporaneous elasticities of taxes and government spending to
the interest rate as well as the contemporaneous elasticity of government spending to
output. These identifying restrictions are consistent with ordering government spending
before output and the interest rate as well as ordering taxes before the interest rate
but after output and ination, as we do here. In the sensitivity analysis below, we
show that using the scheme in Blanchard Perotti (2002) or the exogenous tax liability
changes proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) as a measure of tax shocks produces
similar results.
Interpreting public debt shocks. Previous VAR studies have typically abstracted
from public debt in their empirical analysis with the notable exception of Cheng and
Leeper (2007) and Favero and Giavazzi (2012), who however study only level shocks
rather than modelling and focussing on the volatility shock considered in the empirical
model proposed in this paper. One of the goals of our analysis is therefore to estab-
lish whether such an exclusion is warranted for the purpose of measuring the e¤ects of
7Caldara and Kamps (2012) show that imposing xed values for these elasticities may distort the
inference on the dynamic e¤ects of scal shocks.
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economic policy uncertainty. Because of the scarcity of empirical precedents, we take a
relatively reduced-form approach rather than trying to identify the specic mechanism,
among several theoretical alternatives, that may give rise to a public debt shock. Still,
to develop intuition, in this part of the paper we discuss briey some more structural
interpretations for the deviations of the debt-to-GDP ratio from its expected path.
Following the empirical literature on scal SVARs, our model includes net taxes,
namely government receipts net of transfer and interest payments.8 But Figure 2 reveals
that movements in transfer payments and movements in public debt are remarkably
synchronized, consistent with a possible interpretation of our public debt shock as a
temporary deviation from the expected path of future transfer payments. Indeed, the
CBO projections in Figure 1 as well as the public and policy debates feature prominently
this as a main source of uncertainty surrounding the expected level of future public debt.
Second, the theoretical framework developed by Leeper, Plante and Traum (2010),
Bi (2012) and Bi and Leeper (2013) reveal that the residualsof the equation determin-
ing the debt-to-gdp ratio (i.e. the government ow budget constraint) have a natural
interpretation as a shock to scal sustainability. The latter two papers explicitly model
this equation as a regime-switching process for transfer payments. While it would be
computationally infeasible to build such a non-linear dynamics in our non-linear model,
we note that conceptually consistent with these theoretical studiesour debt shocks
might also be interpreted as temporary deviations from a scal sustainable path.
Third, the intertemporal budget constraint relates current government purchases to
the present value of future tax revenues through the accumulation of public debt. So,
while shocks to net taxes and government spending are more likely to capture deviations
8See for instance Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2007), Caldara and Kamps (2008), Mount-
ford an Uhlig (2009), among many others.
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from the current stance of scal policies, shocks to public debt might be interpreted as
possible deviations from the stance of scal policy that will be adopted in the future.
Finally, our debt shocks may also reect time-variation in debt management, including
changes in the maturity structure and interest payments, and any approximation error
associated with the linearization of the intertemporal government budget constraint.
The considerations above further motivate the choice to include government debt in
our empirical model, over and above government spending and net taxes. Still, addi-
tional restrictions are needed to identify a public debt shock. In analogy to any other
scal shock, the complication comes from distinguishing among three main drivers: auto-
matic stabilizers, discretionary responses to business cycle conditions and discretionary
responses unrelated to the business cycle. Our identication strategy seek to isolate this
third component. Following the literature, we normalize the level of nominal government
debt by nominal GDP. To purge the residuals of the debt equation from the e¤ects of
the endogenous response of scal policy to the business cycle, we order the debt-to-gdp
ratio after real GDP. Similarly, to account for the impact of the price level, ination is
ordered before the debt-to-gdp ratio.
3.3 Computing impulse responses to volatility shocks
To account for the non-linear interaction between stochastic volatility and the level
shocks in equation (1), we use Monte Carlo integration to compute the Generalized
Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) in the spirit of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996).
The GIRF is dened as
GIRF = E

Zt+k j ~ht;	; Zt; t;j = 

  E

Zt+k j ~ht;	; Zt

(4)
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where 	 denotes all parameters of the VAR model, k is the horizon under consideration
and  denotes the shock to transition equation (3). Equation (4) states that the impulse
response functions are calculated as the di¤erence between two conditional expecta-
tions. The rst term in equation (4) denotes the forecast of the endogenous variables
conditioned on an innovation  to the volatility shock of interest at horizon 0. The
second term is the baseline forecast, namely a scenario conditioned on the shocks being
integrated out. Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) describe how to approximate these
conditional expectations via a stochastic simulation of the VAR model. Note that we
calculate the impulse responses for all possible initial conditions (Zt; ~ht) in the sample
and report below the average impulse responses for each endogenous variables. Finally,
equation (4) can also be used to compute the forecast error variance conditional on
a particular shock. Given that, the resulting contribution of each shock to the total
forecast error variance can easily be derived.
4 Empirical evidence
The model (1)-(3) is estimated on U.S. data over the period 1980q1-2015q4 using the
identication scheme described in the previous section. Data between 1970q1 and 1979q4
are used to initialize the priors. We compare the t of the benchmark VAR model with
a linear homoskedastic VAR by using the deviance information criterion (DIC) proposed
in Spiegelhalter et.al.( 2002). As described in the on-line technical appendix, the DIC
rewards t while penalising model complexity. A model with a lower DIC is preferred.
The estimated DIC for our benchmark model is 1795.6 while the estimate for the linear
VAR is 2002.9, suggesting a better t for the model used in the analysis below.
We begin by reporting the estimated time series for the volatility of the scal and
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monetary shocks, which we interpret as measuring economic policy uncertainty. Then,
we move to the impulse response function analysis and nally to the forecast error
variance decomposition. In the next section, we will investigate the sensitivity of our
ndings to alternative identication schemes.
4.1 A novel measure of economic policy uncertainty
The measures of policy uncertainty produced by our empirical model are presented in
Figure 3, together with the policy uncertainty index (dashed blue line) proposed by
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).9 The approach proposed in this paper allows us to
distinguish among uncertainty about the current stance of scal policy, as exemplied
by the standard deviation of the shocks to (i) government spending and (ii) net taxes;
uncertainty about the future stance of scal policy, as exemplied by the standard devi-
ation of the shocks to (iii) the debt-to-GDP ratio, and uncertainty about (iv) monetary
policy.
Our measures of policy uncertainty share a signicant number of turning points with
the index compiled by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). Furthermore, the estimates in
Figure 3 o¤er an interpretation of specic episodes of the recent U.S. economic policy
history. For instance, the large swing in the measure of monetary policy uncertainty
at the beginning of our sample coincides with the Volcker experiment of non-borrowed
reserve targeting. The recession of 1991 and the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 are associated with an increase in the volatility of both
taxes and public debt shocks.
The Great Recession is characterized by the largest uncertainty on the U.S. public
9The authors combine into a single index of economic policy uncertainty the frequency of news media
references, the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years and the extent of
forecaster disagreement over future ination and federal government purchases.
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debt, which over the period 2007-09 appears to become the most prominent source of
economic policy uncertainty. This is interesting because the policy interventions during
the great recession were, at least partially, the endogenous response to macroeconomic
conditions. Still, Figure 3 suggests that the long term nance, and possibly the scale,
of these interventions (as captured by the unanticipated component of movements in
the public debt) rather than the interventions per sè (as captured by the unanticipated
component of movements in government spending) appear to be the most signicant
source of economic policy uncertainty.
From 2010-2014, policy uncertainty is largely reected in the volatility of the net
taxes shock which remains persistently high over this period. The end of the sample is
characterised by a sharp rise in the uncertainty associated with government spending,
monetary policy and public debt shocks with the latter showing the largest increase.
Overall, we regard the good match between swings in our uncertainty measures and
the narrative records of scal and monetary interventions as su¢ ciently reassuring to
proceed to the impulse response function analysis.10
4.2 Impulse response functions
In this section, we report the impact of shocks to the four policy uncertainty measures.
The response to innovations in the level of scal variables and the short-term interest
rate is presented in the technical appendix. The estimated responses are reasonable
from an economic point of view and fairly close to those obtained from a linear BVAR.
A positive spending shock raises GDP and consumption. In contrast, an innovation to
10More specically, the correlation between the Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) policy uncertainty
index and our measures of tax, debt and monetary policy uncertainty is 0.6, 0.4 and 0.3 respectively.
Our government spending uncertainty, however, has a negligible correlation with their policy uncertainty
index.
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taxes and debt results in a decline in real activity, with the estimates being larger in
the latter case. The shock to the short-term interest rate leads to a decline in GDP,
consumption and investment at the one year horizon with ination displaying a modest
price puzzle only in the short-run.
The responses to policy uncertainty shocks are the main focus of our analysis and
are presented in Figure 4. We report the dynamic e¤ects of the four policy uncertainty
measures on real activity, namely output, consumption and investment, and condence
indicators, both for households and rms, following a one standard deviation shock.
The red lines represent median estimates while the shaded areas are 68% and 90%
highest posterior density intervals. Each column refers to a di¤erent economic policy
uncertainty shock, from government spending and taxes on the left to public debt and
monetary policy on the right.
Uncertainty about the debt to GDP ratio in the third column has the largest e¤ect on
output, with a peak around 0:5%.11 The response of GDP is statistically di¤erent from
zero and long-lasting, inheriting the persistence of the volatility process. The response of
consumption is similar, both in shape and magnitude, to the response of output whereas
the decline in investment appears sizably larger. As shown in the technical appendix,
the level of debt also displays a persistent increase in response to this shock possibly
contributing to the adverse impact on real activity. Interestingly, consumer condence
is more sensitive than business condence to debt uncertainty.
The e¤ects of volatility shocks to net taxes are similar to the impact of debt volatility.
Note that debt volatility shocks have a marginally larger impact on GDP than tax
11This peak e¤ect is about three times smaller than the peak e¤ect estimated by Baker, Bloom and
Davis (2016). On the other hand, the size of our shock is about two times smaller than the size that
would have been implied by the metrics proposed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), who consider a
shock as large as the di¤erence in their policy uncertainty index between 2006 and 2011.
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volatility innovations and also appear to a¤ect business condence by a larger amount.
In contrast to net tax and debt volatility shocks, innovations to spending and monetary
policy volatility do not have an impact that is statistically di¤erent from zero.
In summary, the dynamic e¤ects of economic policy uncertainty shocks, especially
public debt and net taxes, on economic activity, consumer condence and business con-
dence appears sizable and persistent. To give a metric for the magnitude presented in
this section, we calculate that according to the estimates of our empirical model it
would take a movement in the short-term rate of about 60 basis points for a monetary
policy shock to generate an e¤ect on output similar to the e¤ect generated by a one
standard deviation shock to the volatility of the debt to GDP ratio.
4.3 Variance decomposition
The impulse response function analysis of the previous section suggests that policy un-
certainty shocks may have large e¤ects on the real economy as well as on consumer
and business condence. In Figure 5 of this section, we evaluate their contributions to
aggregate uctuations by presenting median estimates for the forecast error variance de-
composition of the endogenous variables of the VAR. It is worth noting that the presence
of stochastic volatility in the VAR model makes the variance of the structural shocks
time-varying. This implies that the contribution to the forecast error variance are also
time-varying. In the results below, we report the average of the forecast error variance
decomposition across the entire sample, but we have veried that similar ndings are
obtained over di¤erent sub-periods.
Our estimates suggest that policy uncertainty shocks typically account for about 25%
of uctuations in real activity and condence measures, with slightly higher shares for
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consumption. The overall contribution is typically smaller on impact, tends to increase
with the forecast horizon within the rst year and then stabilize afterwards. While net
taxes and monetary policy volatility make an important contribution to uctuations
in GDP, investment and business condence, the lions share of uctuations appears
accounted by uncertainty on the debt-to-GDP ratio, especially over the medium term.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we assess the robustness of our conclusions to four variants of the restric-
tions imposed onto the baseline specication of Section 4 to recover the scal shocks.
The rst sensitivity analysis is based on the identication of tax shocks proposed by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). In line with their baseline VAR, we only consider a spec-
ication with government spending, GDP and net taxes to which we add public debt.
The reason for this choice is that in order to apply Blanchard and Perottis scheme,
we need to transform the model in a way that standard Bayesian methods for linear
regressions are applicable. In the context of our framework, this is computationally fea-
sible only using a reduced system. In order to implement this scheme, we use the value
of the output elasticity of government revenue (i.e. -2.08) estimated in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002). We retain the assumption that the debt shock has a lagged impact on
the remaining variables in the system. The second robustness check uses the measure
of tax shocks proposed by Romer and Romer (2010) as an endogenous variable in the
VAR model, replacing net taxes. In the third exercise, we focus on the identication of
public debt shocks and add to the baseline specication a measure of the average cost of
servicing the debt, which we order before the debt to GDP ratio. Furthermore, we order
the measures of public debt and its average cost after the short-term interest rate but
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we have veried that the results below are not overturned if we order it before the short
rate. Finally, in order to account for the possible impact of anticipated scal shocks, we
add the Ramey (2011) scal news shock to each equation of the benchmark VAR as an
exogenous variable.
The results of these sensitivity analyses are presented in Figure 6, which reports
the median estimates for the dynamic e¤ects of the shocks to our measures of policy
uncertainty on GDP. Each chart presents the output response to a volatility shock to
public debt (black line with dots), government spending (light blue solid line), taxes
(red line with stars) and monetary policy (green crosses).
In all models, the shock to public debt uncertainty is associated with the largest
e¤ects on real activity, with peak values ranging from about  0:1% in the specication
based on Romer and Romers measure of exogenous tax changes to around  0:9% using
Blanchard and Perottis identication scheme. Adding the average cost of public debt
to the endogenous variables of the VAR brings the peak e¤ect into the neighborhood
of  0:5%. It should be noted, however, that for virtually all measures of real activity
and specications only the impulse responses to a government debt uncertainty shock
are systematically di¤erent from zero at most horizons, with the exception of the Romer
and Romer identication under which the negative e¤ects of public debt uncertainty on
output are still the largest among the policy uncertainty shocks but become insigni-
cant.12
In summary, the results of these alternative identifying restrictions corroborate the
ndings of the previous section that (i) an increase in policy uncertainty appears to
be associated with a signicant output contraction and (ii) among the policy shocks,
12In the on-line technical appendix we show that the benchmark results are preserved if a stock
market index is added to the benchmark VAR model.
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uncertainty about public debt tends to have the most detrimental e¤ect.13
6 Conclusions
Uncertainty about government debt appears to have large and persistent negative ef-
fects on output, consumption and investment as well as on condence indicators for
households and rms. Uncertainty about the current stance of taxes also appears to
have a detrimental impact. Policy uncertainty shocks appear to explain about 25%
of uctuations in real activity, with public debt uncertainty shocks making the largest
contribution.
Our results are based on an empirical model in which the volatility of identied
shocks is allowed, but not required, to have direct and dynamic e¤ects on the endoge-
nous variables of an otherwise standard structural VAR with stochastic volatility. The
empirical framework used in this paper may prove useful to study in future research
also the dynamic e¤ects on the real economy of other sources of macroeconomic uncer-
tainty stemming, for instance, from technological progress, labour market policies and
exchange rate dynamics.
13The variance decomposition analysis conrms that public debt uncertainty accounts for the largest
share of uctuations explained by economic policy uncertainty shocks at horizons beyond two years.
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Figure 2: Government spending, net taxes, transfers and government debt as a share of GDP. Net taxes are dened as current
government receipts minus current transfer payments minus interest rate payments. Sample: 1980q1-2015q4.
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Figure 3: estimates of the policy uncertainty shocks based on the benchmark model. Shaded areas represent 68% credible sets.
BBD index stands for the measure of economic policy uncertainty constructed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).
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Figure 4: dynamic e¤ects of 1 standard-deviation policy uncertainty shocks based on the benchmark model. The dark shaded
areas represent the 68% highest posterior density interval, while the lighter shaded area is the 90% highest posterior density
interval.
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Figure 5: median estimates for the forecast error variance decomposition based on the benchmark model.
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Figure 6: median estimates of the dynamic e¤ects of policy uncertainty shocks on GDP under ve alternative identications of
scal shocks based on four structural VARs estimated for the U.S. economy over the sample 1980q1-2015q4.
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Appendix A: the Gibbs sampling algorithm
Prior Distributions and starting values
Consider the model to be estimated
Zt = c+
PX
j=1
jZt j +
JX
j=0
j
~ht j + 

1=2
t et; et~N(0; 1) (5)

t = A
 1HtA 1
0
; Ht = diag

exp ~ht

(6)
~ht = ~ht 1 +Q1=2t ; t~N(0; 1); E
 
et; i;t

= 0; i = 1; 2::N (7)
VAR coe¢ cients
Let the vectorised coe¢ cients of equation 5 be denoted by   = vec
 
j; j; c

. The initial
conditions for the VAR coe¢ cients  0 (to be used in the Kalman lter as described
below) are obtained via an OLS estimate of equation (5) using an initial estimate of
the stochastic volatility. The covariance around these initial conditions P0 is set to a
diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to 10.
The initial estimate of stochastic volatility is obtained via a simpler version of the
benchmark model where the stochastic volatility does not enter the mean equations. We
use a training sample of 40 observations to initialize the estimation of this simpler model.
The Gibbs algorithm for this model is a simplied version of the algorithm described
in Cogley and Sargent (2005), employing uninformative priors. The estimated volatility
from this model is added as exogenous regressors to a VAR using the data described in
the text in order to provide a rough guess for initial conditions for the VAR coe¢ cients.
Elements of Ht
The prior for ~ht at t = 0 is dened as ~h0  N(ln0; IN) where 0 are the rst elements
of the initial estimate of the stochastic volatility described above.
Elements of A
The prior for the o¤-diagonal elementsA is A0 s N (a^; V (a^)) where a^ are the elements of
this matrix from the initial estimation described above. V (a^) is assumed to be diagonal
with the elements set equal to the absolute value of the corresponding element of a^:
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Parameters of the transition equation
We postulate a Normal, inverse-Wishart prior distribution for the coe¢ cients and the
covariance matrix of the transition equation (7). Under the prior mean, each stochastic
volatility follows an AR(1) process with an AR(1) coe¢ cient equal to the estimated
value over the training sample. The prior is implemented via dummy observations (see
Banbura et al (2010)) and the prior tightness is set to 0.1.
Simulating the Posterior Distributions
The joint posterior distribution H ( ; A;Ht; ; Q) is approximated via a Metropolis
within Gibbs algorithm that samples from the following conditional posterior distri-
butions:
VAR coe¢ cients : H ( jA;Ht; ; Q)
The distribution of the VAR coe¢ cients   conditional on all other parameters  and
the stochastic volatility ~ht is linear and Gaussian:  jZt; ~ht; s N
 
 T jT ; PT jT

where
 T jT = E

 T jZt; ~ht;

; PT jT = Cov

 T jZt; ~ht;

. Following Carter and Kohn (1994),
we use the Kalman lter to estimate  T jT and PT jT where we account for the fact that
the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals changes through time. The nal iteration of
the Kalman lter at time T delivers  T jT and PT jT : The Kalman lter is initialized using
the initial conditions ( 0; P0) described above. This application of Carter and Kohns
algorithm to our heteroskedastic VAR model is equivalent to a GLS transformation of
the model.
Element of A : H (Aj ; Ht; ; Q)
Given a draw for   and ~ht, the VAR model can be written as A (vt) = et where
vt = Zt   c +
PP
j=1 jZt j +
PJ
j=0 j
~ht j and V AR (et) = Ht: For a triangular A
matrix, this is a system of linear equations with known form of heteroskedasticity. The
conditional distributions for a linear regression apply to this system after a simple GLS
transformation to make the errors homoskedastic (see Cogley and Sargent (2005)). The
ith equation of this system is given as vit =  v it + eit where the subscript i denotes
the ith column while  i denotes columns 1 to i   1. Note that the variance of eit
is time-varying and given by exp

~hit

. A GLS transformation involves dividing both
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sides of the equation by
r
exp

~hit

to produce vit =  v it + eit where * denotes the
transformed variables and var (eit) = 1: The conditional posterior for  is normal with
mean and variance given by M and V  :
M =

V
 
a^ols
 1
+ v0 itv

 it
 1 
V
 
a^ols
 1
a^ols + v0 itv

it

V  =

V
 
a^ols
 1
+ v0 itv

 it
 1
The identication scheme in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) involves a non-triangular
A matrix and can be written as Cvt = Fet. However, as shown in Pereira and Lopes
(2014), the C and the F matrices can be transformed such that each implied equation
only contains exogenous shocks on the right hand side. Given this transformation,
Cogley and Sargents equation by equation algorithm becomes applicable again.
Elements of Ht : H (HtjA; ; ; Q)
Conditional on the VAR coe¢ cients and the parameters of the transition equation,
the model has a multivariate non-linear state-space representation. Carlin, Polson and
Sto¤er (1992) show that the conditional distribution of the state variables in a general
state space model can be written as the product of three terms:
~htjZt; / f

~htj~ht 1

 f

~ht+1j~ht

 f

Ztj~ht;

(8)
where  denotes all other parameters. In the context of stochastic volatility models,
Jacquier, Polson and Rossi (1994) show that this density is a product of log normal
densities for ht and ht+1 and a normal density for Zt where ht = exp

~ht

. Carlin,
Polson and Sto¤er (1992) derive the general form of the mean and variance of the
underlying normal density for f

~htj~ht 1; ~ht+1;

/ f

~htj~ht 1

f

~ht+1j~ht

and show
that this is given by:
f

~htj~ht 1; ~ht+1;

~N (B2tb2t; B2t) (9)
where B 12t = ~Q
 1+ ~F 0 ~Q 1 ~F and b2t = ~ht 1 ~F 0 ~Q 1+~ht+1 ~Q 1 ~F : Here ~F and ~Q denote the
coe¢ cients and the error variance of the transition equation, i.e.  and Q in companion
form. Note that, due to the non-linearity of the observation equation of the model, an
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analytical expression for the complete conditional ~htjZt; is unavailable and aMetropolis
step is required.
Following Jacquier, Polson and Rossi (1994), we draw from (8) using a date by date
independence Metropolis step with the density in (9) being the candidate generating
density. This choice implies that the acceptance probability is given by the ratio of
the conditional likelihood f

Ztj~ht;

at the old and the new draw. In order to take
endpoints into account, the algorithm is modied slightly for the initial condition and
the last observation. Details of these changes can be found in Jacquier, Polson and Rossi
(1994).
Parameters of the transition equation : H (j ; A;Ht; Q) and H (Qj ; A;Ht; )
Conditional on a draw for ~ht, the transition equation (7) is a VAR(1) model with a
diagonal covariance matrix. The conditional posterior for the coe¢ cients  is normal
with mean and variance given respectively by:
 = (x0x) 1 (x0y)
v = Q
 (x0x) 1
where y = [~ht; yd] and x = [~ht 1;xd] with yd and xd denoting the dummy observations
that implement the prior.
The conditional posterior for Q is inverse Wishart and is given by
H (Qj ; A;Ht; ) ~IW (S; T )
where T  denote the number of actual observations plus the number of dummy obser-
vations and S = (y   xb)0 (y   xb)
The on-line technical appendix to the paper presents a small Monte-Carlo experiment
that shows that this algorithm displays a satisfactory performance.
Convergence
The MCMC algorithm is applied using 500,000 iterations discarding the rst 50,000 as
burn-in. We retain every 45th draw out of the remaining 450,000 iterations. In order to
assess convergence, we compute the Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostic which indicates
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Figure 7: The Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostic.
the total length of the run required to generate a desired level of accuracy. We report
the diagnostic for two quantiles 0.025 and 0.975. As in Primiceri (2005), the remaining
parameters are: desired accuracy 0.025, probability of attaining desired accuracy 0.95.
The results are presented in gure 7. The gure shows the estimated total length of
the run across the elements of the di¤erent parameter block. Note that the suggested
number of iterations are well below the 500,000 iterations employed in our algorithm.
As a further check we calculate ine¢ ciency factors (IF) and report them in gure 8.
The IF are an estimate of 1 + 2
P1
k=1 k where k is the autocorrelation of the chain
and the innite lag is approximated using a Parzen window. Values of IF around 20 are
deemed acceptable. With the exception of some stochastic volatilities, this conditions
seems to be satised for most parameters. For the stochastic volatilities the majority
(greater than 70%) of IF are below 30. Given the large number of endogenous and state
variables, in our view this is reasonable evidence for convergence.
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Figure 8: Ine¢ ciency Factors
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Appendix B: data
BEA refers to Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/), FRED is Federal
Reserve Economic data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) and GFD refers to Global
Financial Data. The data is available from 1970Q1 to 2015Q4. We employ the rst
40 observations as a training sample, hence the e¤ective sample runs from 1980Q1 to
2015Q4.
Fiscal data
 Government spending: Government consumption expenditures and gross invest-
ment (BEA Table 1.15 Line 22) divided by population and deated by the GDP
deator.
 Net Taxes: Current Receipts (BEA Table 3.1 Line 1) minus current transfer pay-
ments (BEA Table 3.1 Line 22) and interest payments (BEA Table 3.1 Line 27)
divided by population and deated by the GDP deator.
 Government Debt: Federal Debt Held by the Public (FRED series id FYGFDPUN)
divided by nominal GDP.
 Average cost of debt servicing: Net interest payments divided by Federal Debt held
by the public lagged one quarter. Net interest payments are obtained as interest
payments (BEA Table 3.2 Line 32 minus interest receipts (BEA Table 3.2 Line
15).
Macroeconomic/Financial data
 Real GDP per capita: Real GDP (FRED series id GDPC96) divided by population.
 Consumption of non durable goods and services: (FRED series PCND plus FRED
series PCESV) deated by the personal consumption expenditures deator (FRED
series id PCECTPI) and divided by population.
 Investment: Gross Private domestic investment (FRED series id GPDI) deated
by the GDP deator. This is then divided by population.
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 CPI (FRED series id CPIAUCSL). We calculate ination as the annual growth in
CPI.
 3 month Treasury Bill rate (FRED series id TB3MS). From 2009Q1 to 2015Q4,
we use the shadow rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2015). This is obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
 Business Condence Index: OECD business condence indicator (GFD code:
BCUSAM).
 Consumer Condence index: University of Michigan Consumer sentiment (FRED
id UMCSENT and UMCSENT1).
 Population ( FRED series id POP)
 GDP deator (FRED series id GDPDEF)
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